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Abstract
This article describes how a public transportation system in a mid-sized southern 
state was assessed in regard to its adequacy in providing transportation services. The 
article begins by discussing the trends in current transportation patterns, funding 
of public transit, and special populations served by public transit. A case study is 
then presented of a transit system that was experiencing what has become a typical 
problem for similar transit systems across the nation: intensified public and political 
pressures caused by funding cuts and unfunded mandates from the federal govern-
ment. Findings from the case study are then provided along with recommendations 
for change. Finally, the outcome of the study is presented. 
Introduction 
The personal automobile continues to be the favored mode of transportation 
in the United States, in spite of public support for mass transit. A recent survey 
showed that about 0 percent of Americans use public transit regularly (Larwin 
00). Thus, the vast majority of Americans rely on their personal automobiles to 
meet their transportation needs. Factors that have resulted from increased reli-
ance on automobiles include the expansion of urban boundaries, urban planning 
that discourages use of public transit, rising numbers of those who own a car, a 
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readily available freeway system, and long commuting trips to areas where there is 
no public transit service. However, there are those who simply do not have access 
to an automobile and who rely solely on public transit to get them to and from 
work, medical appointments, child care facilities, and leisure activity sites. 
In large metropolitan areas with well-utilized public transit systems, riders are 
more diverse in regard to socioeconomic status. However, in small to mid-size 
cities, riders tend to be predominantly poor and live in the innercity. In regard 
to planning, transit operators across the United States are increasingly pressured 
to provide transportation services to those with automobiles who live in outlay-
ing areas. This emphasis on commuter-oriented express (both bus and rail), in 
many respects, directly conflicts with transportation services that are increasingly 
needed in the innercity. The working poor are particularly at risk in that adequate 
and reliable transportation is seen as a primary barrier to self-sufficiency (Perry-
Burney and Jennings 003), in addition to getting and keeping a job (Brabo et al. 
997). 
Conditions for Crisis
In the United States, public transit service is subsidized to a great extent. However, 
since 980 Congress has increasingly reduced transit funding, leaving greater fis-
cal responsibility on state and local governments for funding public transit ser-
vices. Additionally, the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) placed unfunded 
mandates on local transit, which were required to provide door-to-door service 
for those who were disabled. Transit officials also had to expand their fleet of 
small buses to accommodate this mandate or re-equip existing buses for easier 
access. More stringent federal emissions regulations required that many buses be 
replaced with more energy-efficient ones.
When combined, these factors have placed a great deal of pressure on local gov-
ernments to continue providing quality services, while at the same time experienc-
ing cuts in funding. In several areas of the United States, transit authorities, with 
support from state legislatures and local government leaders, have attempted to 
offset these funding cuts with various combinations of state funding, motor vehi-
cle taxes, and the collection of local taxes directed specifically for transit (Chan et 
al. 003). The following is a case study of one such public transit system that found 
itself at the crossroads of having to make significant changes in order to continue 
offering high-quality and reliable transit services to the population it served. In 
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many respects, this case study reflects the realities that are faced by several transit 
systems in small and mid-sized cities across the United States. 
Case Study Background
In February 003, a Pulaski County (Arkansas) judge, in conjunction with the 
mayors of Little Rock, North Little Rock, Maumelle, and Sherwood and the Central 
Arkansas Transit Authority (CATA) board president, sent a letter to the University 
of Arkansas at Little Rock (UALR) chancellor requesting that the university con-
duct an analysis of the adequacy of transit service provided by CATA. Their spe-
cific concerns focused on issues of affordability, maintaining standards of service, 
financing, governance, and future developments in regard to CATA. 
In April 003, the UALR chancellor convened a 0-member multidisciplinary task 
force comprising those with expertise in business, public administration, organi-
zational design, engineering, finance, communication, social work, marketing, law, 
political science, and urban studies.
Central Arkansas Transit Authority 
History of Structure and Governance
From 90 to 97, the transit system in the Little Rock area was privately owned 
and operated. During this period, three private entities attempted to make a 
profit on transit operations and failed. A 97 study recommended that the 
transit system shift to public ownership under the direction of a regional author-
ity. Area leaders formed a transit policy board (Metroplan), made up of elected 
officials from Pulaski and surrounding counties, and in 97 the Central Arkansas 
Transit Authority (CATA) began operations as a publicly-owned entity (Chan et 
al. 003). 
In 98, Pulaski County, along with the cities of Little Rock, North Little Rock, 
Cammack Village, Maumelle, Sherwood, and Jacksonville (Jacksonville withdrew 
in 987) entered into an Interlocal Agreement that established CATA in its cur-
rent form. The agreement was deemed necessary because these local governments 
were being asked to infuse increasing amounts of money into CATA and wanted 
more of a say in the operations. Additionally, at the time it was determined that 
CATA was not being managed or supervised effectively as a transit operation 
(Chan et al. 003). 
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The Interlocal Agreement determined that CATA would be governed by a 3-
member board of directors whose members would be appointed for four-year, 
staggered terms by the six participating area governments that oversee CATA. 
Board membership is representative of the funding percentage by each partici-
pating government. As the largest financial contributor at the time of this study, 
Little Rock had five members appointed by the Little Rock board of directors, two 
of whom were City employees. Three CATA board members were appointed by 
the mayor of North Little Rock, one of whom was a City employee, and two were 
appointed by the Pulaski County judge, one of whom was a County employee. 
Finally, three board members were appointed by the mayors of the three addi-
tional communities that CATA served, one of whom was a City employee at the 
time of this study (Chan et al. 003). 
History of Funding and Finance
Until the 970s, federal funds accounted for up to half of operating funds. Starting 
in 984, funds were reduced, and then in 990–99 there was a total withdrawal 
of federal operating funds for public transit. CATA, along with transit authorities 
across the nation, was faced with the dilemma of finding alternative sources of 
funding. Among the options were taking a portion of highway revenues and apply-
ing them to local transit, creating a dedicated funding source, and/or creating a 
combination of state and local taxes, in addition to fares.
In regard to securing dedicated funding sources for transit, several states have 
gone to levying sales taxes (Las Vegas; New York City Transit; Mass Bay Transit, 
Massachusetts), property taxes (Bay Area Rapid Transit, California; New York City 
Transit), and fuel taxes (Metropolitan Transit, Tennessee; San Diego Transit). In 
regard to local dedicated funding sources for public transit, several cities have 
implemented sales taxes (Foothill Transit, Los Angeles County; Norwalk Tran-
sit, California), property taxes (Birmingham-Jefferson Transit, Alabama; Orange 
County Transit, California), and fuel taxes (Los Angeles County Metro; Washing-
ton DC Metro) (Federal Transit Administration 00). 
In CATA’s case, funding at the local level was established by a mileage formula 
within the 98 Interlocal Agreement. Contributions were based on revenue 
miles, resulting in Little Rock at 73.9 percent; North Little Rock, 8.4 percent; 
Pulaski County, 7.09 percent; and Maumelle, Sherwood, and Cammack Village all 
less than  percent. Due to operations and capital expenditures, the local govern-
ments grew from 98 to 00. During that time, Little Rock’s appropriations 
to CATA grew from $ million to $4. million in 00. Fiscal crisis and deficits 
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prompted reduced service in 00 and 003. At the time of this study, 78 percent 
of CATA funds were obtained at the local level, 0 percent were derived from fares 
(farebox revenue totaled $.3 million), and approximately  percent came from 
state revenues (Central Arkansas Transit Authority 00). 
Additionally, the ADA created unfunded mandates on local transit to provide 
door-to-door service for the disabled. A large proportion of funds was needed 
to equip buses for increased accessibility for those who had disabilities. Finally, 
tighter federal air emission standards required that CATA replace its fleet of buses 
to meet the new standards.
As a result of a funding crisis, in 993 voters of Little Rock adopted a half-cent 
sales tax earmarked, in part, for public transit. This was a particularly important 
development, especially since CATA receives a small percentage of its operating 
budget from the State (Arkansas ranks last among all states in transit spending.). 
The increased tax revenue was distributed to the general funds of participating cit-
ies, where transit funds would compete with police, fire, and solid waste disposal 
services. During each yearly budgetary session, CATA was placed in the position 
of lobbying local government leaders for its share of the funds. CATA became 
engrossed in a year-to-year struggle to maintain even minimal transit services. As 
operating costs have increased dramatically over the past several years, this pro-
cess had become quite contentious (Chan et al. 003). 
CATA responded to fiscal stress by reducing its staff (CATA had the smallest pro-
fessional staff of all comparable systems studied) and cutting back service hours 
through route contraction. A reduction in service, along with the publicized bud-
get battles, resulted in deterioration of the public’s image of and trust in the public 
transportation system.
Demographics, Current Operations, and Rider Profile
At the time of this case study, CATA had 4 large buses, 0 small buses, and 8 vans 
in daily use. The authority provided  regular fixed-routes, 0 express routes, and 
paratransit services. CATA served 8,000 to 9,000 riders per day, of which almost 0 
percent were employed full-time, another  percent were employed part-time, 
and 8 percent were students. Thus, 83 percent of CATA consumers were economi-
cally active outside the home or were students in preparation for work life. 
CATA’s standard of bus frequency, regardless of day or whether peak/off peak 
hours, is that there should be one bus every 30 minutes at designated stops. In 
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00, however, a number of weekday buses typically required more than 30 min-
utes to make the route. 
The income of CATA riders was low, with  percent making less than $0,000 
a year. Those who had incomes between $0, 000 and $4,999 represented the 
highest percentage of riders. Only 3 percent of riders reported income of $40,000 
or more. Those who used the bus seven days a week had lower incomes than 
those who used the bus five or six days a week. Seven-day riders were thus more 
transit dependent as a result of their low incomes. Seventy-two percent of riders 
were above the age of 3, and a large percent (73%) were African American. More 
than 80 percent of CATA riders lived in households with no car (Central Arkansas 
Transit Authority 00).
Case Study 
Participants
Six bus riders and 3 public transit stakeholders (community leaders, CATA 
board/staff members, and area experts on public transportation) participated in 
the case study. 
Public Transit Stakeholders. This group included Little Rock City board members, 
CATA staff and board members, area mayors, the executive director of Metroplan, 
the Little Rock City manager, and several area experts on transportation and the 
poor. 
Experts on services to the poor included one executive director of a public service 
agency that works on behalf of the poor, three case managers from this same 
organization, and one executive staff member from the Department of Human 
Services.  
Bus Riders. Riders who took part in this case study comprised daily consumers of 
CATA. They included underrepresented minorities, those economically disadvan-
taged who were currently employed, and long-time users of the CATA system. 
Participants in this group included two men and four women. There were four 
African Americans and two European-Americans. Two members were daily bus 
rides at the lower end of the economic scale (working class at a service industry 
pay scale). Four participants had physical disabilities, were enrolled in programs at 
Goodwill, and were receiving assistance to help them become more independent 
and self-reliant through job training, job placement, or life skills development. 
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Data Collection 
Information for the case study was collected over a period of five months. The task 
force reviewed previous reports and surveys that involved CATA and its opera-
tions, conducted structured interviews, and performed an analysis of CATA and 
its operations compared to other transit systems in comparable-size cities. Partici-
pants were interviewed either face-to-face or within the context of a small group. 
A set of structured interview questions was developed by task force members 
to achieve uniformity in information and to assure that important themes were 
adequately captured by all participants who were interviewed. 
Findings and Recommendations 
Findings from this case study were organized into three separate categories: () 
funding and structural factors, () governance, and (3) operational conditions.
Funding and Structural Factors
A consistent theme that emerged from the case study was the funding crises 
in public transit. At the time of this case study, CATA was struggling to meet 
its already-reduced services and had no anticipated funds to expand services in 
needed areas. From its findings, the task force recommended two strategies: () 
seek additional funding for current operations by securing a countywide hotel/
motel lodging tax of $ per bed per night and () mount a campaign to pass a 
countywide, one-fourth cent sales tax dedicated to transit in the area. It was antici-
pated that such funding would act to secure a dedicated funding source for CATA 
and put an end to the yearly budget battles. Such funds would then allow CATA 
to not only fund its current operations more predictably and autonomously, but 
also would allow the operation to grow and develop as a public system. Ending the 
yearly budget battles, which are publicized, would create conditions where CATA 
could begin to rebuild its public image as a reliable transportation alternative. 
Governance
A common theme that emerged from the interviews with those familiar with 
the structure of the CATA board was that its composition was problematic. The 
current structure of having City and County employees occupying key positions 
on the CATA board was perceived by participants as being a conflict of interest. 
Several participants believed that the current structure focused more on the sta-
tus quo of service delivery and was more maintenance versus leadership oriented. 
From these findings, the task force recommended that City and County employ-
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ees should not serve as CATA board members. Instead, it was recommended that 
the board be restructured to include a mix of elected officials and other residents 
who have no major governmental or public agency affiliation. The task force 
anticipated that this change in composition would build a more independent and 
more regionally focused board that could effect change (Chan et al. 003). 
The case study also found that transit in Central Arkansas had outgrown the 
conditions present when the 98 Interlocal Agreement was formed. The task 
force recommended that, in its place, a Regional Transit Authority be established. 
The authority would be governed by a board consisting of the mayors and the 
county judge. The Interlocal Agreement would create a legal entity separate from 
the previous jurisdictions. The authority would have the power to issue revenue 
bonds, but would not have an independent authority to tax. The Regional Tran-
sit Authority would be responsible for operating a transit system that satisfies 
the basic needs of equity, accessibility, and special needs, as well as for planning 
economic development, land use, and work access that is securely connected to 
transit. Decisions regarding transit would not be made in isolation, but rather as 
an integrated part of regional development (Chan et al. 003). 
Operational Conditions
Findings from this component of the case study were obtained primarily from bus 
riders and local experts on transportation and the poor. Both riders and experts 
perceived a lack of adequate service for those working shifts and nontraditional 
work hours in locations where no public transportation is available or is limited. 
All the participants in this group were aware that major growth was occurring in 
the western region of the city where bus service is limited. In many instances, social 
service providers and case managers had little trouble getting jobs for their clients, 
but had great difficulty getting them to and from these jobs. Bus rider participants 
expressed overall distrust in public transit. They were acutely aware of services 
being cut and had no confidence that the routes they currently relied on, most 
particularly on weekends, would continue. Other barriers to adequate transporta-
tion expressed by riders were not living near a bus route, limitations in the number 
and frequency of routes, limitations in the hours and days of operation (limited on 
Sundays), and difficulty in trip chaining. 
Based on these findings, the task force recommended that a reverse-commute 
service be added to assist those dependent on transit to reach work in suburban 
fringe areas. The task force also proposed expanded paratransit services for dis-
A Public Transit System in Crisis
3
abled riders and urged CATA to begin working with major employers to attract 
and retain employees who rely on public transit. A cost feasibility analysis would 
be needed to justify the implementation of these recommendations.
Outcome of the Case Study
On September 7, 00, the Metroplan board of directors approved a final draft 
of METRO 2030, the region’s federally mandated long-range transportation plan. 
METRO 2030 was built on previous efforts that produced METRO 2020 in 99 and 
METRO 2025 in 000. The policies put forth in METRO 2030 represent a series of 
strategies that determine the region’s planning and transportation direction. In 
regard to public transit, the plan recommended that new funding sources be iden-
tified and developed with the goal of doubling the size and service of the bus transit 
system. Longer range plans included bus rapid transit, light rail, or commuter rail 
systems. The plan also called for proposals for dedicated local funding for transit 
projects. METRO 2030 recommended retaining current fixed routes, adding more 
routes, increasing frequency of routes, extending express service from Little Rock 
to West Little Rock, extending service hours, and providing Sunday service. The 
plan also included expansion of paratransit services over the planning period. In 
addition, during the planning period, funding for CATA would increase from $307 
million to $78 million. The additional $4 million represents -/ times more 
service and service hours when compared to existing transit service. The additional 
funding is expected from a . cent local option sales tax levied in Pulaski County 
within the first five years of the plan. Such a strategy would require the referral of 
the tax to voters by the Pulaski Quorum Court, in addition to a successful cam-
paign to gain voter approval (Metroplan 00). 
Conclusions 
It is axiomatic that the success of an assessment on any organization and the ser-
vices it provides lies in the utilization of its recommendations by its stakeholders. 
The findings and recommendations from this case study were presented to all the 
stakeholders mentioned above and to the general public. It was encouraging to 
find that several of the central recommendations (primarily around service deliv-
ery and funding) were reflected in Metroplan’s METRO 030 final draft. 
As evidenced in this case study, no single solution will solve the problems related 
to public transit. Public transportation has become, in most metropolitan areas, 
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conceptualized as a social service for the poor. To be productive participants in 
society, those who are economically disadvantaged must have access to reliable 
transportation that gets them to and from work every day. There is increasing 
pressure placed on those who rely on government subsidy to seek employment, 
and there are significant barriers to getting and keeping jobs for the poor. As these 
pressures mount, it is imperative that communities work toward improving the 
reliability and availability of public transportation. Any effort toward significant 
and lasting change must involve the entire community in a coordinated effort that 
focuses on several factors simultaneously. In an effort to bring about substantial 
change in services to the poor, organizations, such as the one presented in this 
article, must be assessed in such a way that considers the complex array of internal 
and external factors that impact that particular organization and the services it 
provides. 
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